The EU in the western Balkans: Enlargement as Empire?

A Response to David Chandler by O'Brennan, John
 The EU in the western Balkans: Enlargement as Empire?  
A Response to David Chandler 
 
JOHN O’ BRENNAN 
 
Introduction 
 
David Chandler has made a major contribution to the literature on state-building, 
humanitarian intervention and international trusteeship over the past decade. In 
particular he has sought to depict and deconstruct the different ways in which the 
Balkans has become a laboratory for sundry forms of international governance in the 
wake of the conflicts of the 1990s. In his Global Society article Chandler elaborates 
on the European Union’s role in the region, and, specifically, on the EU’s 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), an institutional mechanism designed to 
draw candidate states closer to the Brussels model of European integration. Chandler 
argues that the EU enlargement process represents little more than a diplomatic cover 
for a more pernicious project – that of building an empire on the eastern and south 
eastern fringes of Europe. His argument is a tripartite one. First, he claims that the EU 
projects its considerable power through the enlargement process but is unwilling to 
take responsibility for the outcomes its demands produce in candidate and associated 
countries. Second, the consequence of this power projection in the western Balkans 
has been a qualitative and measurable deterioration of governance resulting from the 
relations of power being increasingly and damagingly divorced from relations of 
accountability. Finally, he asserts that the enlargement process produces weakened 
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states, which, although they possess international legal sovereignty and all the formal 
attributes of statehood, in reality lack any substantive ownership over the political 
process in their countries because they cannot meaningfully exercise power in a way 
which deviates from EU demands. They are regime takers in a classic construct of 
asymmetrical power relations.1  
 
This article takes issue with all of these arguments and contends that they are based 
on a fundamental misunderstanding of the EU enlargement process, of the normative 
nature of EU power, and of the reasons for the administrative and governance vacuum 
we find in the western Balkans region. In exploring the fundamental nature and shape 
of EU enlargement policy in the western Balkans the article argues, contra Chandler, 
that the policy being pursued by Brussels is consistent with the expectations of the 
‘normative power Europe’ approach to enlargement. Far from attempting to re-
configure the Western Balkans in a neo-colonial fashion, the EU has sought to use its 
revolutionary ‘soft power’ to export its norms and values to the region and draw it 
into the integration process. In this sense the instruments employed under the SAP are 
familiar from previous enlargement rounds and designed to lead to a decisive 
transformational outcome in the region. The rationale behind the EU approach is that 
the enlargement process helps to consolidate and stabilise democratic structures, build 
institutional and administrative know-how, and over time, draw applicant states closer 
to EU standards.  
 
But the western Balkans is not Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
enlargement process faces specific difficulties not encountered during the course of 
                                                 
1 David Chandler, ‘EU Statebuilding: Securing the Liberal Peace through EU Enlargement’, Global 
Society, Volume 21, Number 4, (2007), pp.593-607 
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the five previous successful enlargement rounds. Two in particular stand out. First, 
there are a series of outstanding issues related to borders, status and territorial 
integrity which continue to destabilise the region as the constitutional order in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Macedonia remains contested and fragile. The reactions across the region 
to the declaration of independence by the Kosovan government of Hashim Thachi on 
17 February 2008 served to underline the continuing sense of crisis. The second set of 
problems is those that derive from the persistence of corruption and criminality across 
the region and, in particular the way these have an impact on the rule of law and state 
building practices. What critics of EU policy fail to recognise is that the sheer scale of 
organised crime, and its manifestation in patterns of rent seeking and state capture, 
constitutes the single greatest threat to the stabilisation of state and society in the 
western Balkans and, simultaneously, the most active impediment to the success of 
the SAP and enlargement. Alongside this the phenomenon of ‘enlargement fatigue’ 
has made it more difficult to justify a process of deep engagement with aspiring 
members who seem less than committed to the internalisation of EU norms and 
values. The EU has never faced problems of this scale or magnitude in previous 
accession contexts and has struggled to adapt policy when confronted with evidence 
of non-compliance or contestation. Despite these difficulties the EU has remained 
consistent in pursuing an open and transparent process which privileges normative 
adaptation on the part of the candidate states, and following that logic, insists upon 
real and substantive implementation of EU norms and values in the domestic political 
order of candidates as the key determinant of ‘success’ in the accession framework.  
 
Enlargement as Empire? 
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The idea of the European integration process as an imperial project is not a new one. 
It infuses much of the economic critique of the EU as a ‘neoliberal’ project with 
‘Brussels’ bent on spreading pure market principles both within and beyond its own 
borders and seemingly indifferent to welfare outcomes. The traditional conceptions of 
empire mutate, in this view, into a more acceptable and legitimate contemporary 
(liberal) form, but the essential goals of empire – political domination and economic 
rapaciousness – remain core pursuits of the so-called ‘Euroelites’. The imperialist 
imagery has been increasingly applied to the enlargement process as the EU has 
expanded into southern, northern, eastern, and now (at least prospectively) into south 
eastern Europe in successive rounds of expansion.2  
 
The ‘enlargement as empire’ thesis rests on two fundamental misconceptions about 
the nature of accession negotiations. The first relates to the choices made by aspiring 
member states during the process of economic and political transition from 
Communism. David Chandler and other critics of the EU argue that for those states 
escaping Soviet domination in the early 1990s one form of imperial subjugation was 
to be exchanged for another: Soviet oppression would be replaced with the pervasive 
regulatory regime of Brussels, or to put it another way, one type of political ‘union’ 
(Soviet) would give way to another equally repellent one (EU). Europe’s post-
Communist states, in this view, pursued EU membership, not because they saw it as 
vital to their national interests but rather because of the irresistible force projected by 
Europe’s new dominant geopolitical actor.  
                                                 
2 See, for example, Andreas Bieler, ‘The Struggle over EU Enlargement: A Historical Materialist 
Analysis of European Integration,’ Journal of European Public Policy, Volume  9, Number 4 (2002): 
575-597; David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, (London: Pluto Press, 1999); 
Gerald Knaus and F. Martin, ‘Travails of the European Raj’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, 
Number 3, (2003), pp.60-74; R. Paris, (2002), ‘International Peacebuilding and the “mission 
civilsiitrice” , Review of International Studies, Volume 28, Number 4, pp.637-56. 
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 What these assertions overlook, however, is that for the European states emerging 
from the shadow of the Soviet monolith, there was a clear normative aspiration – a 
‘Return to Europe’, the Europe from which, it was frequently asserted, these states 
had been forcibly separated for over four decades.3 The new CEE governments from 
the beginning framed their endeavours and aspirations with explicit reference to the 
core values of the European integration project.4 They sought freedom, prosperity, 
and a secure place in the international community of nations, and especially within 
European organisations. In recent years similar sentiments have been increasingly 
expressed in the post-conflict western Balkans (even in the more fragile political 
climate of recent months) as elite and popular opinion has converged around the 
necessity of becoming part of the European ‘club’. The European Union has been 
embraced on a voluntary basis as the material and normative structure to which 
aspiring states wish to attach themselves.  
 
The ‘enlargement as empire’ thesis also mistakenly frames the enlargement process as 
an entirely asymmetrical negotiation, where the EU continually makes demands and 
candidate states habitually acquiesce with EU views. The 90,000 odd pages of legal 
approximation measures contained in the acquis communautaire must be transposed 
into domestic legislation and thereafter implemented accordingly. There is a wealth of 
evidence from the eastern enlargement round, however, of a negotiating climate 
which allowed for significant variance in the compliance regime, one where candidate 
states succeeded in negotiating derogations or implementing legal measures in 
                                                 
3 See Iver B. Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus’, 
Alternatives, Volume 23, (1998), pp. 397-416;  
4 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts? in Helen 
Wallace and William Wallace, (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, fourth edition, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000),  p.433. 
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‘creative’ ways so as to avoid penal domestic adaptation costs. Candidate states 
frequently expressed displeasure at EU demands and the domestic cost of adapting to 
EU norms. But equally there were many examples of candidate states either failing 
outright to comply, or only complying partially with, EU norms and practices. The 
Slovak government under Vladimir Meciar long resisted EU demarchés (Should this 
read démarches?)  (yes, change to demarches ) about freedom of expression and the 
media. Polish demands during the latter part of the enlargement negotiations in 2002 
were presented quite insistently and in good part were eventually met in the talks 
which concluded at Copenhagen in December 2002.5 Hughes, Gordon and Sasse 
demonstrate that EU conditionality in the regional policy realm was fiercely contested 
in some candidate states.6 Beate Sissinich’s (change to Sissenich) work on the 
adoption of the social policy acquis in Hungary and Poland similarly demonstrates the 
significant gap between transposition of legislation and actual implementation by 
candidate states. EU successes in cross national rule transfer were much more 
contingent on the relative strength of local administrative capacity rather than 
coercive tactics.7 Finally, Frank Schimmelfennig has consistently argued that EU 
conditionality does not work in a one-dimensional ‘regime-maker/regime-taker’ 
fashion.8 Rather each accession relationship will be characterised by different degrees 
of contestation and different pathways towards (or away from) compliance. Likewise, 
within the wider European integration process there is significant ‘wiggle room’ for 
                                                 
5 See Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe, (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004); John O’ 
Brennan, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), part one. 
6 James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, ‘Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s 
Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-National Government, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Volume 42, Number 3, 2004, pp.523-51. 
7 Beate Sissinich (change to Sissenich), Building States without Society: European Union Enlargement 
and the Transfer of EU Social Policy to Poland and Hungary, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). 
8 Frank Schimmelfenig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel  International Socialization in Europe: 
European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2006). 
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candidate states to implement EU measures in ways which allow for variance in 
administrative practice, cultural norms and other variables.  
 
The European Union thus has to tread a delicate balance between the desire to pursue 
candidate states for non-compliance and the political impulse to maintain momentum 
within the enlargement process. The scepticism among current member states of the 
EU about the ability of the western Balkan states to comply with accession demands 
derives in large part from the perception that Bulgaria and Romania failed to deliver 
on implementation commitments prior to their accessions in 2007 and were treated far 
too leniently by the European Union which placed the political ambition to have these 
two states inside the EU above the Union’s collective interest in ensuring that they 
complied fully with the acquis communautaire. The Bulgarian and Romanian cases 
should be viewed in a wider context, however, and that is the extreme reluctance that 
the EU demonstrates towards ‘hard’ sanctioning measures in instances of non-
compliance. Coercive intervention is viewed as a political negative and to be avoided 
if at all possible in favour of socialisation over time into EU behavioural logics. The 
exception in the case of the western Balkan states may well be EU demands relating 
to ICTY compliance – on more than one occasion candidate states have found their 
progress within the negotiations hampered by the failure to convince former ICTY 
Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte of their bona fides in finding and arresting indicted 
war criminals. But this exception also serves to emphasise the strong attachment 
within the EU to the core normative principles under which the enlargement process 
operates. 
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If contestation and partial compliance are as relevant to the enlargement regime as EU 
demands for reform, it is also important to keep in mind that negotiations with 
candidate states proceed in good faith on the understanding that they will in time 
become full and equal members of the ‘club’, with full voting rights and all the 
prestige of equals around the negotiating table in Brussels immediately on 
membership. Whilst candidate state representatives frequently express dissatisfaction 
with their status in the negotiations they persist because the rewards to be garnered 
from full membership are deemed to be so substantial. One example of this is the 
enhanced role of Slovenia on the world stage since it assumed the EU Presidency on 1 
January 2008 (the first of the 2004 intake to do so). Do Slovenes see themselves as 
neo-colonial eunuchs bowing to the will of ‘EU officialdom’ or to the more powerful 
member states of the EU as they preside over EU affairs? Do Poles consider 
themselves second class members after four years of membership? Have they been 
afraid to press their national interests because of an attachment to a mindset of 
domination inherited from the long years of negotiating accession? The answer to 
these questions is obviously ‘no’ and directly contradicts the Chandlerian view that 
the process of negotiating accession leads inexorably to a hollowing out of state 
capacity in prospective member states. 
 
 
Moreover if one accepts that the eastern enlargement process is now being employed 
in the most substantive way as a template for the integration of the western Balkan 
states and other aspiring members, then this begs the question of why eastern 
enlargement did not produce a governance vacuum in the Czech Republic or 
Slovenia. If local democratic structures in Estonia and Hungary developed in the 
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‘shadow’ of enlargement demands why did they not ‘hollow out’ and atrophy, as 
David Chandler asserts has happened in the western Balkans? Rather, across Central 
and Eastern Europe political systems have bedded down and matured to a point where 
they closely resemble the consolidated democracies in northern and western Europe. 
The political landscape has been transformed along recognisable contours with 
regular free and fair elections for all levels of political office, functioning systems of 
public administration, substantive oversight of policy-making by elected 
representatives, a pluralist and free press and a vibrant civil society. If the 
‘enlargement as empire’ thesis is to hold up then we should expect to find the 
degraded culture of public office which one finds in the western Balkans, continued 
nationalist dominance of political discourse, overt clientelism, rampant corruption and 
administrative dysfunctionality as the hallmarks of political life in CEE. That this is 
not the case constitutes demonstrable evidence of how unique and challenging is the 
situation in the western Balkans today. 
 
Earlier Entrants 
 
Another strand of the contemporary ‘enlargement as empire’ thesis is the comparative 
one in respect of the membership criteria which the EU places before aspiring 
member states. The main contention here is that previous entrants merely had to meet 
the very basic criterion of holding free and fair elections for political office and this 
was held to constitute the main indicator of responsible governance. David Chandler, 
for example, instead of analysing the criteria applied within the eastern enlargement 
round chooses to focus on the demands made of Spain and Portugal during the course 
of their accession negotiations in the 1980s. He then suggests that the western Balkan 
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states are now being held to a much higher standard than any previous entrants, with a 
much more robust oversight of basic governance functions by the EU. Western 
Balkan states are now failing in meeting the ‘new, and more exacting’ standards laid 
down for membership. The goalposts have been changed to such a degree that current 
applicants have little chance of achieving their ambition of membership. 
 
Professor Chandler is absolutely correct in arguing that the rules of the enlargement 
game have changed quite dramatically since the Iberian accessions in 1986. But, like 
other advocates of the ‘enlargement as empire’ thesis, he does little to examine the 
qualitative reasons for this change of practice and the much more ‘hands-on’ approach 
by the EU to accession negotiations which is now the norm. In the 1970s and 1980s 
the then European Economic Community (EEC) had no clear membership criteria 
because they simply were not required – there was no prospect of any significant 
expansion taking place. It was only the end of the Cold War which brought about a 
radical reconfiguration of geopolitics on the continent of Europe and, for the 
European Union, the key question emerged of how the Community might respond to 
the CEE countries’ stated desire for membership of the club. For the first time, Article 
237 of the Treaty of Rome, which simply stated that ‘any European State can apply’ 
for membership of the Community, began to be scrutinised. 
 
In addition, Chandler fails to mention how the EU itself changed dramatically in the 
25 to 30 years since Spain, Greece and Portugal negotiated their accessions. The 
treaty revisions ushered in by the Single European Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam and 
Nice all acted radically to re-constitute the old Community, with a considerable 
expansion in the scope of EU activity and associated regulation. The addition of a 
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huge volume of legislation related, for example, to the Single Market Programme, 
after 1987, or to Justice and Home Affairs after Maastricht, means that aspiring 
member states now face a very different acquis communautaire than did earlier 
entrants. The scope of policy now falling exclusively or partially under EU 
competences has expanded exponentially. Simply to ignore these two influences on 
enlargement policy, as the ‘enlargement as empire’ critics, do means they 
misrepresent the nature of the challenge faced by both the EU and candidate states in 
the contemporary period. In short, one is simply not comparing like with like when 
contrasting the relatively smooth accession paths of Spain and Portugal with the 
criteria placed before later candidates for membership.  
 
Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that the rules of the enlargement game have 
changed again in response to the EU’s experience of managing the eastern 
enlargement. In particular the very nature of EU political conditionality has changed 
markedly with new patterns evident in the aims, approach and priorities as well as the 
methods employed by the Commission to achieve compliance with EU norms.9 A 
core element of this change lies in the development of a set of norms related to state 
capacity and to the functioning of candidate states’ systems of public administration 
and the judicial system. These have become important touchstones for the western 
Balkan states in their quest for membership. Geoffrey Pridham argues that the EU 
absorbed any number of lessons from the eastern enlargement round and those lessons 
prompted the deployment of a more ‘muscular’ conditionality in the western Balkans. 
Various new mechanisms have been introduced to improve implementation of 
accession-related legislation. Monitoring of commitments is much more intrusive than 
                                                 
9 Geoffrey Pridham,  ‘Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, 
Approach and Priorities’, Democratization, Volume 14, Number 3, (2007), p. 454. 
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ever before after the introduction and extension of so-called ‘safeguard clauses’ (cf 
Bulgaria and Romania) and the new procedure of ‘bench-marking’ for provisionally 
opening and closing of specific negotiating chapters. Thus all SAP and potential 
candidate states face a qualitatively different and more challenging enlargement 
environment than previous applicants.10 There is no evidence, however, of any 
systematic bias against current candidates, either as a symptom of so-called 
‘enlargement fatigue’ amongst the member states or a qualitative change of direction 
by the European Commission in its oversight of the process. Rather the main 
problems facing the western Balkan states in their efforts to meet the membership 
criteria are local and structural ones.  
 
EU Officialdom as ‘overlords’ on Enlargement Policy? 
 
Advocates of the ‘enlargement as empire’ thesis reproduce one of the most popular 
images of the European Union when asserting that the accession process effectively 
transfers large areas of policy-making “into the hands of EU officialdom as strict 
measures are laid down adopting the EU acquis covering 29 chapters of the acquis 
amounting to almost 90,000 pages of EU regulations”.11 This is Brussels as an 
overweening, power-hungry ogre, the famed Brussels bureaucracy pushing the 
boundaries of its own power ever outwards. Such a view gives the impression that the 
enlargement process is completely dominated by unelected, unaccountable 
bureaucrats who push aside the member states and their representatives during the 
course of accession negotiations and impose their own neo-colonial imprint on the 
process and on the candidate states as they push for more and more ‘reform’ of 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p.454. 
11 David Chandler, op. cit., p.598 
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domestic governance in advance of membership. It should be noted that these critics 
of EU policy rarely expand much on what they actually mean by ‘EU officialdom’, 
although quite often the argument revolves around the power and influence of the 
European Commission. Chandler, for example, alleges that all of the important 
instruments of the accession process are under the control of the Commission, and 
thus no meaningful control can be exerted, either by democratic actors within the EU, 
nor by representatives of the candidate states. In Chandler’s perspective ‘EU 
officialdom’ is thus reducible to the European Commission.12 In fact, as in most other 
areas of EU policy making, enlargement involves a complex division of labour 
(internally) between the EU institutions. Moreover, although the Commission does 
indeed play a central bureaucratic role in the enlargement process this is balanced by 
the (territorial) input of both the Council and the (representative) functions of the 
European Parliament.  
 
The Commission’s influence within enlargement politics stems principally from two 
sources. The first is its formal power to initiate policy proposals, which helps it to set 
and shape the enlargement policy agenda. Although, as in the general integration 
framework, it seeks to anticipate, incorporate and adjust for the specific concerns of 
member states (and increasingly the EP), it has often found itself to be (almost by 
default) the sole policy entrepreneur and thus the best placed EU actor within the 
enlargement process. It is important to understand that much of the Commission’s 
power within the enlargement process evolved out of the early response by the EU to 
events in CEE in the early 1990s. Facing the challenge of managing relations with the 
new democracies, the Commission was confronted with an environment it had never 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p.601 
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previously encountered. From the outset of the process member states were dependent 
on the Commission for leadership and policy advice. It was the Commission which 
took responsibility for managing the initial aid programmes for CEE, produced the 
Opinions on the ability of the candidate states to meet the criteria for membership and 
oversaw the screening process, that is, the analysis of the transposition and 
implementation efforts by candidate states. Even in the latter stage of negotiations 
where the member states were in the ascendancy and the Presidency played a crucial 
role, the Commission continued to cajole, deliberate, and persuade both insiders and 
outsiders of the merits of its enlargement strategy.  
 
But the Commission’s role has been and continues to be balanced by those of the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Because the Council sits at the 
apex of the EU decision-making system and all enlargement decisions are subject to 
the unanimity rule, the member states hold the whip hand, as in all other areas of 
foreign policy, and can (and frequently do) threaten to veto a policy move if they find 
it unsatisfactory or distasteful.13 Once negotiations with applicant states conclude it is 
the Council which takes the decision (by unanimity) to accept or reject them. 
Ultimately, therefore, the important decisions with regard to western Balkan 
accessions will be made by the member states of the EU collectively with the formal 
assent of the European Parliament also now being necessary. Thus any substantive 
examination of the division of labour on enlargement reveals a much more complex 
institutional structure than the simplistic ‘EU Officialdom’ would suggest. 
 
States Without Sovereignty? 
                                                 
13 Cyprus and Greece have both threatened to put an end to Turkish accession negotiations on various 
occasions over the past four years. Austria threatened to veto the opening of negotiations with Turkey 
in October 2005 unless Croatia was also allowed to proceed to a fully fledged negotiation. 
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 One of the central elements of the Chandler critique of EU policy is that the state-
building and institution-building activities of the international community 
(spearheaded by the EU through the SAP) penetrate domestic politics so 
overwhelmingly and powerfully that the cumulative effect is a ‘hollowed out’ 
domestic politics where the prerogatives of local actors are relentlessly reduced to a 
point where there is no meaningful ownership over the political process. David 
Chandler argues that the democratically elected political representatives in the 
western Balkans states constitute less than sovereign actors within their own 
countries. Their political space has been emptied of functional importance, in large 
part due to the demands made through the SAP by ‘perfidious Brussels’. Specifically: 
 
the atrophied political space hinders attempts to cohere post-conflict societies 
and overcome social and political divisions. The states created, which have 
international legal sovereignty, but have ceded policy-making control to 
external officials in Brussels, lack organic mechanisms of political 
legitimation as embodiment of a collective expression of the will of their 
societies. Their relationship of external dependency on the EU means that the 
domestic political space cannot serve to legitimise the political authorities or 
cohere their societies14  
 
Arguably no-one would disagree that there is a significant governance vacuum in 
much of the western Balkans today.15 But the extent to which the western Balkans 
                                                 
14 Chandler, p.604. 
15 See Robert Bideleux, ‘Making Democracy Work’ in the Eastern Half of Europe: Explaining and 
Conceptualisaing Divergent Trajectories of Post-Communist Democratisation’, Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, Volume 8, Number 2, (2007), June, pp.109-130. 
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deviate so much from Central and Eastern Europe, under a similar regime of EU 
oversight, should point us in the direction of disaggregating in favour of specific 
regional explanations of democratic and economic inertia. Whilst it is clear that all 
former communist states fell victim to high rates of corruption and crime in the years 
after 1989, there is an important divide between CEE and SEE in the relationship 
between organised crime and the development of the state. It is clear that, although 
corruption persists in CEE the problem is much more acute in the western Balkans. If 
the domestic political arena has hollowed out or is atrophied to the point that there is 
no meaningful local participation in and ownership over the political process, this is 
not necessarily due to enlargement or the demands of the EU. Would any serious 
analyst describe the Czech or Slovene political space as atrophied as a result of 
sustained engagement in exactly the sort of process in which the western Balkan 
states now participate? The simple fact is that the behaviour and preferences of local 
political actors and domestic political agency provides a much more satisfactory 
account of the governance failures and problems with institution-building across the 
region.  
 
The problem of corruption runs so deep in the western Balkans that it has given rise to 
the widespread image of a region ‘captured’ by criminal interests which have 
managed to suborn political, social, and judicial processes, hampering much-needed 
reforms and depriving citizens of an impartial rule of law.16 Bideleux describes these 
groups as ‘brutal, predatory, vertical and semi-autonomous power structures’ which 
are largely beyond democratic scrutiny and control,17 and which have succeeded in 
                                                 
16 Emil Giatzidis, ‘The Challenge of Organized Crime in the Balkans and the Political and Economic 
Implications’. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Volume 23, Number 3, (2007), 
September, pp.327-51. 
17 Bideleux, op.cit., p.120. 
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instrumentalising local and national political actors with the result that organised 
crime has “seeped into every aspect of public life, bearing significant influence over 
political stability, rule of law, legality, and social and economic development (where 
does this quote end?). (it ends with economic development” ) 18 Weak states in 
combination with strong oligarchs and organised crime meant that the main prize of 
political competition in much of the western Balkans over the past two decades has 
been control over state-owned resources.19 Giatzidis asserts that ‘criminal 
organizations have risen to be the largest industry in the region and the single greatest 
threat to regional stability, in large part because these groups survival depends on 
crushing any efforts to introduce transparency, accountability and moderation in the 
political and economic systems of the state’.20  
 
There is a powerful operational dialectic at work in the EU’s relationship with the 
western Balkan states and in particular in these states’ efforts to tackle organised 
crime and combat corruption. Criminal networks and gangs can only survive and 
flourish in a vacuum, where state capacity to regulate is weak, where the state can be 
captured through bribery, blackmail and intimidation of officials, and where the legal 
system lacks transparency and adequate enforcement mechanisms. In contrast EU 
enlargement conditionality requires of other SAA and candidate states, a substantive 
and rolling commitment to rule-based democratic governance, transparent decision-
making and effective judicial enforcement. Thus the further the western Balkans 
advances towards EU membership the more is required of the state in defeating the 
power of entrenched criminal networks. The real problem facing the EU in the region 
                                                 
18 Daniela Irrera, ‘The Balkanisation of Politics: Crime and Corruption in Albania’, EUI Working 
Papers, RSCAS No. 2006/18, Florence: European University Institute, p.2. 
19 Giatzidis, op.cit., p.334. 
20 Ibid., p.328. 
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is that it is extremely difficult to disentangle the state from criminality. As Irrera 
argues in respect of Albania, which “illustrates a paradoxical case where the very 
individuals who seem to contributing to implementing institutional corruption – 
elected party leaders – are entrusted at the same time by the EU to return the country 
to the rule of law (where does this quote end?) (the quote ends with rule of law”) .21. 
The nexus between organised crime and politics is dangerously close and at the least 
an impediment to the achievement of both candidate state aspirations for membership 
and EU integration objectives.  
 
This is not to argue that the EU strategy has not itself contributed to the problem in 
the region. One sustained criticism across the western Balkans has been the 
unrelenting focus on rule of law and governance issues at the expense of economic 
development and tackling underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty.  This is a 
very valid criticism. In the case of Bosnia, Domm identifies a ‘clash of agendas’ 
between an EU/Euro-Atlantic agenda focused on building defence capacity and the 
rule of law, and the agenda of domestic actors centred on employment and social 
protections.22 In this sense EU policy seems to stand in opposition to the 
developmental trajectory of the original post-conflict European Economic Community 
which did so much to energise the integration process in the 1950s and 1960s and 
later through the Single Market Programme.23 Another important criticism is that EU 
policy often plays into the hands of militant nationalist groupings, or at the least fails 
to marginalise them. As Rory Domm puts it: “strong-arm tactics required to push 
through reform risks grid-locking governing institutions and playing into the hands of 
                                                 
21 Daniela Irrera, op.cit., p.2. 
22 Rory Domm, ‘Europeanisation without Democratisation: A Critique of the International Community 
Peacebuilding Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Journal of Southeast European and Blacksea 
Studies, Volume 7, Number 1, (2007), p.165. 
23 Ibid., p.170. 
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nationalists, subsequently reducing the political space in which moderate parties may 
operate”.24 It is worth pointing out that in Bosnia the European Commission has 
belatedly acknowledged the validity of this criticism and clearly stated that it will not 
accept SAA-related legislation imposed through the ‘Bonn Powers’ mechanism.25  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
David Chandler’s has contributed much to our understanding of the dynamics of post-
Dayton politics in the Balkans. But his caricature of the EU enlargement process as an 
imperial venture seems wholly inappropriate. The argument here is that far from 
attempting to re-configure the Western Balkans in a neo-colonial fashion, the EU has 
sought to use its revolutionary ‘soft power’ to export its norms and values to the 
region and draw it into the integration process. Subsequent to the completion of the 
eastern enlargement process in 2007 the western Balkans now loom as the most 
serious challenge facing the EU in its external policy. This is not least because of the 
renewed salience of issues connected to borders, status and territorial integrity 
triggered by the Kosovan declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 and the 
renewed violence witnessed in Macedonia during the May 2008 election campaign.  
 
The EU enlargement regime is a tried and tested one and constitutes the most 
successful instrument in the EU’s external relations toolkit. But it is now facing a 
challenge in the western Balkans which is manifestly more difficult than anything 
                                                 
24  Ibid.,  p.167. 
25  Ibid., p.162. 
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encountered in previous accession contexts. In particular, the problem of first order 
democratisation, extending to the practice of statebuilding, remains cogent and, in the 
fallout from the Kosovan declaration all the more important in regional terms. 
Overlaying a post-conflict transformation environment, EU policy has been as much a 
question of relating to and engaging with democratic transition as democratic 
consolidation.26 The problem of inadequate state capacity is compounded by the 
relationship between state power and organised crime.  As Gatzidis argues: “We are 
no longer facing societies penetrated by hosting the parasitical ‘black economy’: we 
are facing societies dominated by it in every aspect. We are facing entities that, by 
virtue of this pervasive system, are financially and otherwise more powerful than 
nation states in the region”.27 Thus for the EU there is also a question of adaptation, 
of re-configuring the successful formula of capacity building supported by 
conditionality which worked so well in the case of eastern enlargement. At a practical 
level one could argue that the focus on democratic regime building needs to be 
recalibrated in favour of a more direct effort to engage western Balkan societies and 
citizens (a more open and accessible visa regime, further support for civil society 
programmes) in tandem with a much greater level of economic subvention. Similarly, 
an opening up of the SAP towards a much more substantive focus on economic 
development and welfare outcomes would also help to marginalise the local actors 
who continually contest and obstruct progress in the enlargement process. That said, it 
is clear that the Chandlerian critique of enlargement policy is fundamentally 
misplaced. It is the structural cancer of organised crime and its hold over state 
officials and structures which constitutes the single greatest threat to a normalisation 
and europeanisation of the western Balkans in an enlargement context. 
                                                 
26 Pridham, op.cit., p.455. 
27 Giatzidis, op.cit., p.340. 
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